ABSTRACT As the professional practice of intelligence collection adapts to the changing environment and new threats of the twenty-first century, many academic experts and intelligence professionals call for a coherent ethical framework that outlines exactly when, by what means and to what ends intelligence is justified. Reports of abuse at detention centres such as Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib, the ever increasing use of technological surveillance, and the increased attention on the use of torture for intelligence collection purposes have all highlighted a need to make an explicit statement about what is and what is not permissible intelligence practice. In this article an ethical framework will be established which will outline under what circumstances the use of different intelligence collection activities would be permissible. This ethical framework will first underline what it is about intelligence collection that is 'harmful' and, therefore, should be prohibited under normal circumstances. The ethical framework then outlines a set of 'just intelligence principles', based on the just war tradition, which delineate when the harm caused can be justified. As a result, this article outlines a systemic ethical framework that makes it possible to understand when intelligence collection is prohibited and when it is permissible.
Introduction: Intelligence and Ethics
As the professional practice of intelligence adapts to the changing environment and new threats of the twenty-first century, many academic experts and intelligence professionals call for a coherent ethical framework that outlines exactly when, by what means and to what ends intelligence is justified. For Sir Michael Quinlan there is 'no area of human activity, whether public or private', that can claim 'an a priori entitlement to require the moralist to be silent', and intelligence should be no exception.
1 Indeed, reports of abuse at Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib, allegations of extraordinary rendition programmes, and the ever-increasing pervasiveness of the 'surveillance state', have highlighted the need for a coherent, systematic review of the place currently occupied by ethics in intelligence.
*Email: r.bellaby@sheffield.ac.uk 1 It is partially because of these controversies that a focus on ethical (and associated legal) issues is emerging in the field of intelligence. 2 In recent years several specific cases have underlined the need for explicitness regarding what should be acceptable intelligence practice. Torture, for example, is an issue at the forefront of the debate regarding what standards should be expected from a state and its intelligence agencies. Inhumane treatment of Binyam Mohamed at Guantanamo Bay, in Pakistan and Morocco, and his claims that he was subject to a CIA-run extraordinary rendition programme have, for example, raised public outcry and forced the British government to announce a judge-led inquiry into how such activities were allowed to happen. 3 Furthermore, in American politics, the issue of torture and the legitimate treatment of terrorist suspects held centre stage for much of the Bush administration and casts a long shadow onto the Obama administration. 4 Concern has also arisen over the growing ability and tendency of intelligence and security services to intercept, monitor, and retain personal data in an increasingly computer-centred world. The 2009 UK House of Lords report, Surveillance: Citizens and the State, highlighted significant anxiety regarding the possible threat surveillance practices have to individual privacy. The report sought to stress the need to review CCTV camera usage, internet traffic monitoring, DNA databases and wiretaps, questioning the role they should have in a western liberal society. 
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Intelligence and National Security Subsequently, it is no longer deemed viable for intelligence communities to maintain their shadowy existence, free to act out of sight and out of mind. The Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly has, for example, expressed dissatisfaction with the current standards and mechanisms applied to intelligence practices. It has called for the drafting of a European code of intelligence ethics and to subject intelligence agencies to 'codes of conduct, accompanied by robust and thorough supervision'. 6 If liberal democracies are to be seen abiding by the rules, norms and ideals to which they subscribe, then so must their intelligence communities. However, while there is clearly a need for an explicit statement on acceptable and unacceptable behaviour from intelligence agencies, what is less clear is what an appropriate ethical framework should look like.
At the centre of the topic of 'intelligence ethics', often ridiculed as 'oxymoronic ', 7 is the tension between the belief that 'there are aspects of the intelligence business, as practised by all major countries, that seem notably disreputable', 8 and the argument that 'without secret intelligence we will not understand sufficiently the nature of some important threats that face us'; 9 that political communities have an ethical obligation to act so as to protect its people. 'Princes are obliged by the law of nature', in the formulation of Thomas Hobbes, 'to make every effort to secure the citizens' safety . . . they may not do otherwise. ' 10 As a result, intelligence communities face a tension created by, on the one hand, the duty to protect the political community and, on the other hand, the reality that intelligence collection may entail activities that negatively affect individuals. The aim of this article is, therefore, to deal with this tension by establishing a two-part ethical framework that outlines those parts of intelligence collection that might be considered ethically 19. There are two main ethical arguments for this position. The first argument is based on the ontological justifications for wars of self-defence drawn from the 'domestic analogy' whereby the ethical argument for the individual defending himself is extrapolated 'up' onto the state. The second moral argument is based on the argument that 'allows one to justify courses of action with reference to the good of the political community' and 'maintains that acting in the national interest is itself complying with a moral principle'. Erskine, 'Rays of Light', p.364. unacceptable while incorporating the pivotal role intelligence plays in protecting the political community.
The first part of the ethical framework will argue that the reason why intelligence collection might be considered 'ethically unacceptable' is because of the 'harm' it can cause the individual.
11 By understanding this negative aspect of intelligence is it then possible to determine if and when intelligence collection is justifiable. In order to achieve this, the second part of the ethical framework will argue for a set of just intelligence principles. These principles are a set of criteria based on the just war tradition that, by making reference to the principles of just cause, legitimate authority, right intention, last resort, proportionality and discrimination, then make it possible to outline the circumstances under which the harm caused is justified.
Harm: Primum Non Nocere -First, Do No Harm?
The first step in establishing an ethic against harm begins with the realization that individuals have certain requirements that are both 'vital' to their wellbeing and vulnerable to external interference.
12 These 'vital interests' are the prerequisites or preconditions that must be maintained if individuals are to fulfil their ultimate goals and aspirations. Joel Feinberg calls these requirements 'welfare interests'. 13 John Rawls calls them 'primary goods'. 14 Essentially they amount to the same thing -that is, regardless of what one's conception of the good life might be, these preconditions must be first satisfied in order to achieve them. These interests include individuals' physical and mental integrity, their autonomy, liberty, sense of self-worth and privacy. Without these vital interests any individual is unable to pursue other ultimate interests, purposes, goals or plans. 15 Of such fundamental importance are these interests to the individual that they have intrinsic value. Damaging them can therefore cause harm regardless of the repercussions. That is, even if on balance the individual does not experience the harm in a 'tangible and material' way, s/he can still be said to be harmed if the vital interests are violated or wronged. 16 In this way, these interests are a person's most important ones and thus demand protection.
Albeit John Mackie urges a measure of scepticism about any idea of objective values or cross-cultural statements regarding what it means to harm someone and what values should or should not be respected as important to the individual, especially since their content will vary greatly depending on one's culture. Nevertheless it is still possible to outline those interests vital to all humans, irrespective of what conception of the good life they may hold. 17 Indeed, it is possible to isolate those factors of central importance in any human life, regardless of what end the person chooses to pursue. Martha Nussbaum argues that through a notion of overlapping consensuses it is possible to outline the core vital interests held by all individuals, identifiable 'without accepting any particular metaphysical conception of the world, any particular comprehensive ethical or religious view, or even any particular view of the person or human nature'.
18 Quite simply, an individual's core interests can be determined by isolating those aspects of the human condition whereby individuals would be unable to continue with their higher or more ultimate wants if they did not have these interests maintained. For example, being creatures of flesh and bone instantly 'implies mortality, vulnerability '. 19 This demonstrates the need to protect the physical body as one of our most important vital interests.
Importantly, however, protecting the physical body is not all. The need for mental integrity, autonomy, liberty, a sense of self-worth and a degree of privacy are each vital in an individual's life. For instance, if the mental integrity is damaged then people no longer have the capacity to continue or experience their life in a 'truly human way'; 20 if their autonomy is distorted or controlled then individuals are unable to formulate what they think their own life plan should be; if their liberty is restricted then they can no longer articulate plans; without a sense of self-worth they can become despondent and unwilling to continue with their plans; and finally if their privacy is unduly violated then the effect it can have -for example, anxiety, distrust and the inability to freely express oneself freely -can prevent them from acting out their life.
'Harm', therefore, can quite simply be defined as the violation of an individual's most vital interests. This concept of harm, however, is not a binary one whereby individuals exist in a state of un-harm and then are utterly destroyed when their vital interests are damaged. Rather can have their vital interests affected, violated or damaged to varying degrees depending on the extent they are affected as the individual.
Vital Interests
The list below represents a set of moral principles designed to demonstrate those vital aspects of the human condition that can be agreed upon by people who might otherwise have very different views regarding how one should carry out one's life, and the aims one should have.
Physical Integrity
Maintaining the integrity of the physical body is among the most fundamental interests possessed by an individual. The body is the physical home and representation of the self. It is the chief means through which the human condition is experienced and then acted out. If the body is damaged it severely hinders the individual's ability to actualize any other aspect of the human experience. As such, there is, first and foremost, an interest in protecting the body: 'virtually any conception of the good life goes better in the absence of physical injury'. 21 In order to maintain this vital interest, the individual must be left to live life until its natural end; be adequately nourished and sheltered; be free from absorbing pain and disfigurement; and finally, to have bodily boundaries respected as sovereign.
In relation to intelligence collection, for example, one of the most important issues intelligence operatives must resolve is what sort of physical treatment potentially dangerous suspects can expect. The answer to this question is one that invariably revolves around the issue of pain and the conditions to which the suspect is subjected. Elaine Scarry calls pain the 'voice of the body', 22 a voice that is all-encompassing in its demand for attention. Pain can completely debilitate the body, making the individual unable to conceive of anything else and forces the body to deal with the cause of the pain immediately. The greater the physical pain the greater the debilitating effect. Irwin Goldstein notes that pain is one of those experiences which is 'self-evidently, indisputably, objectively bad; some people see it as essentially evil'. 23 Even John Mackie, whose central thesis is that 'good' and 'bad' designate properties which do not and could not exist and thus that no object really is good or bad, grounds robust ontological assertions on the premise that evil exists and is flourishing in pain and other familiar phenomena. 24 Many types of physical attacks can violate this interest, including striking, cutting, amputating or severely damaging the physical body or actions such as 'stress positions' designed to inflict increasing levels of pain over a period of time. 21 Barry, Justice as Impartiality, p.88. 22 
Autonomy
The concept of autonomy is the capacity for self-rule. That is, one must be able to decide for oneself, without external manipulation or interference, what shape one's own life will take. As Nussbaum puts it: 'autonomy is being able to form a conception of the good and to engage in critical reflection about the planning of one's life -the protection of the liberty of conscience'. 25 Maintaining the integrity of an individual's autonomy requires first that the individual's rational functioning be protected, meaning that s/he has the capacity to plan, choose, and reflect on options. 26 For example, drugging individuals violates their rational capability as it physically prevents them from forming a reasoned decision. Second, in order for individuals to be autonomous agents it requires that they be free to be self-directing in that their decision-making process should not be excessively influenced or controlled by another force. Autonomy is circumvented if the decision-making process is overly distorted or pressure is applied to alter it. Autonomous agents must be able to act for 'reasons all 25 Nussbaum, Women and Human Development, p.79. Feinberg calls this the 'condition of self-government', and Richard Lindley refers to it as 'authorship' and 'self-rule', but it is essentially referring to the same phenomenon. the way down according to their actions and according to their reasons'. 27 If an outside force puts pressure on an individual's decision-making process then the decisions made are not taken in light of the individual's own wishes or beliefs, but are based on that of the person applying the force. The pressure will alter the individual's decisions, forcing activities to be carried out or beliefs to be held that would not have been otherwise. The individual loses self-mastery, becoming a tool of the will of another.
Acts of deception and manipulation, for example, are harmful inasmuch as they interfere with an individual's autonomy. Since lies are designed to 'eliminate or obscure relevant alternatives', 28 when people are the victim of a deception their view of reality is distorted and they are forced to act or hold beliefs based on this distorted view. The victim of the deception is basing his decisions on the wishes of the deceiver rather than his own will. Similarly, acts of manipulation violate an individual's autonomy in that they exert a pressure on the individual's decision-making process in order to encourage a certain response. As a result, the individual's actions or beliefs become the result of the manipulation rather than being the result of the individual's will.
Liberty
Closely connected to the concept of autonomy is the interest an individual has in liberty. Liberty, as Mill notes, is 'not the so-called Liberty of the Will . . . but Civil, or Social Liberty: the nature and limits of the power which can be exercised by society over the individual'. 29 Whereas autonomy is the freedom to decide one's will, liberty is the freedom from constraints on acting out that will. As such, liberty is often simply defined as the 'absence of interference or control', 30 and to defend an individual's liberty is to set a limit on the extent of intervention by other individuals or society. For example, if I am prevented by others from doing what I could otherwise do, I am to that degree 'unfree'. 31 collection is the question of when and for how long an individual can be stopped and detained. Often there is a fine balance between being able to collect information from an individual to understand the threat they pose and the interference this has on the liberty of the individual. Limits on the powers of authorities to stop and search an individual exist to prevent the violation of the individual's liberty. For example, when the UK government proposed an increase in the number of days suspected terrorists could be detained pre-charge to 42 in response to the 7 July 2005 London terrorist bombings, the ensuing debate in both the UK House of Lords and the Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly was based on the need to protect the liberty of the individual.
32
Human Dignity as Amour-propre: A Sense of One's Own Self-Worth Confidence in one's self-worth is so fundamental that without it one can become unable to continue or realize endeavours that are needed to fulfil one's aspirations. Without self-respect individuals feel worthless; nothing 'seems worth doing', activities become 'empty and vain' and people 'sink into apathy and cynicism'.
33
There are two dimensions to an individual's sense of self-worth; first is how individuals view themselves and second is how others view them. The first aspect is the result of the argument that one the most important and intimate relationships for anyone occurs 'every time you look in the mirror', where 'you are faced with your closest ally and your, potentially, greatest enemy'. 34 When individuals experience shame or humiliation they are looking at themselves, judging themselves and finding themselves wanting. When humiliation is forced upon an individual by someone one else, s/he is forced to look at themselves through the eyes of this other, they judge themselves as those eyes would judge them and they then feel degraded in some way. 35 The second dimension to the individual's sense of self-worth is related to how individuals are viewed by those in their identity group. One of the most important aspects of an individual's sense of self-worth is the role played by external recognition. It is not just how we view ourselves that is important, 32 35 Normally this involves making the individual look at himself through the eyes of an external spectator and to judge himself as that external spectator would do. To be sure, this external spectator does not have to exist physically but rather exists as a metaphor to represent the new position as compared with the previous unconscious state he thought or hoped or unthinkingly assumed he was in. This observer could be actual or imagined; self-or externally created; a particular individual, identity group or even a higher power; or quite simply a set of social constructs and norms which shape our interpersonal lives. G. Taylor, Pride, Shame and Guilt (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1985) p. 66. but also how the ego thinks others perceive it. This means that reputation plays a vital role in an individual's sense of self-worth. Name-calling might not cause physical injury. Yet it can, even without one's knowledge, do harm insofar as there is a vital interest in having others think well of oneself. 36 If, for example, the individual falls short of the rules or expectations of their identity group, s/he runs the risk of losing their respect and therefore losing important social and material benefits afforded by their current positionjob, money, security, the love and affection of family and friends. Moreover, given that the 'ego thinks of itself as others think of it', 37 when s/he loses the respect of her/his identity group s/he loses the esteem that s/he had previous gained through them. Individuals draw strength and their own identity from their identity-group and without affirmation individuals can lose their sense of self-worth. Furthermore, they will then view themselves as those around them do, as degraded. Actions designed to humiliate or make the individual feel in some way degraded are therefore harmful because they aim to make the individual view her/himself as less than s/he is.
Privacy
Privacy is a term that is often used but rarely has an agreed definition, but rather acts as an umbrella concept covering a vast range of prohibitions and claims. For some, privacy is a psychological state; 38 for others, privacy is the extent to which 'information about them is communicated to others'. 39 Others again see it purely as a physical state of affairs, being separated off from the rest of society. 40 
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Intelligence and National Security concepts of particular relevance to intelligence collection: privacy as boundaries and privacy as control. Boundaries mark out areas where outside intrusion is unwelcome. These boundaries -both physically manifested or created as a result of socially accepted norms -separate what is private on the inside from everything else on the outside. Over-stepping the mark, as it were, and violating an established boundary means violating the privacy of that person. This views privacy as the ability to separate oneself from the rest of society by setting out spheres of non-intrusion. These boundaries can be physical -walls, clothes, bags for example -or they can be metaphysical social constructions such as 'personal space'. In comparison, privacy as control is the right of individuals to control those things pertaining to themselves, that is, 'the control we have over information about ourselves' 41 or the 'control over one's personal affairs'. 42 Privacy thus conceived is often seen as akin to property rights in that 'one's actions and their products 'belong' to the self which generated them and are to be shared only with those with whom one wishes to share them'.
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Privacy is often seen as a vital interest as a result of both its instrumental as well as intrinsic worth. It is instrumentally vital since violations of one's privacy can result in severe physical, monetary, or social penalties. As long as we live in a society where 'individuals are generally intolerant of life styles, habits and ways of thinking, and where human foibles tend to become the objects of scorn or ridicule, our desire for privacy will continue unabated'. 44 For example, blackmail gains much of its power from the material costs people would suffer if certain acts were to become known. However, privacy is also intrinsically valuable since, regardless of the financial or social damage that any privacy violation might cause, an individual would still want to maintain this right. That is, even those who have nothing to hide would still object to other people being able to see or listen to them while they were in private. Many philosophers argue that there is a need for a sphere of privacy in order for individuals to relax, find emotional release, self-reflection and self-analysis. 45 Even if the individuals are not aware their privacy is being violated, they are still 'harmed' insofar as their vital interest is wronged. For example, a camera inside an individual's home constitutes a violation of privacy and it can be argued that harm is done even though s/he might not experience the violation in a tangible or 41 material way. Therefore, for intelligence collection, the interest in privacy features heavily in the debate over the right to be able to communicate in private, access the internet in private, control personal information and live in a house free from outside observation.
Intelligence Collection and Harm
It can be argued, therefore, that violating an individual's vital interests should be prevented. An individual's vital interests are so fundamentally important that without them individuals are unable to continue with their aims, goals and aspirations. The problem for intelligence collection, however, is that some of the activities it uses can conflict with one or more of these vital interests, and there is a compelling argument to be made that the resulting harm should be prohibited. Given that the activities involved in and entailed by intelligence collection are multifarious, it would be impossible in a single study to outline every way in which intelligence might cause harm. It is, however, important to demonstrate how intelligence collection can conflict with an individual's vital interests and how it consequently has the potential to cause harm. 46 Privacy is one of the first vital interests with which intelligence collection can quite often come into conflict, especially since much intelligence collection involves attempts to discover what others wish to keep secret. An example is that of communications intelligence. Communicating with other people is an essential human activity, without which planning, organizing or carrying out any activity is increasingly difficult. The advances in computer technology have only exaggerated this, with technological means of communication increasingly permeating every aspect of society. For intelligence organizations, intercepting these communications can be vital. As Mark Lowenthal argues, communication intelligence 'gives insight into what is being said, planned and even considered' by one's friends and enemies alike and is as close as one can come, from a distance, to reading another side's mind. 47 However, by intercepting another's communications, their privacy is violated. This is because, first, the activity involves intercepting and utilizing without consent information that is essentially the individual's property, and second, by violating a sphere with a strong expectation that the individual is 'in' private, represented by the clear distinction between the 'inside' of the communication where the message 46 It is possible to make the claim that 'open source' intelligence is not going to cause harm by virtue of the fact it involves collecting information that is open to everyone. However, while this, in a vast majority of cases, might be true, it is not necessarily so. This is a review of the intelligence collection 'activities' rather than the intelligence 'sources'. The ethical status alters depending what actions are used rather than the type of sources aimed at. So, while open sources will probably not involve the same type of manipulation or deception that secret sources will more likely involve, there is no guarantee that this will always be the case. 47 Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, p.71.
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Intelligence and National Security exists and the 'outside' where the rest of society exists. 48 There are longstanding social conventions attaching to the privacy of one's communications -a notion that is reflected in the famous, and often derided, quotation from then US secretary of state Henry L. Stimson in 1929 that, 'Gentlemen do not read each other's mail'.
49
Surveillance is another example of how intelligence collection can conflict with an individual's vital interests as both the individual's privacy and autonomy can be violated. 'Surveillance' can cover a wide range of activities from CCTV cameras and 'covert surveillance' 50 to dataveillance and datamining. 51 Who the individual 'is', where s/he is going, with whom s/he is associating or what s/he is doing all become the concern of the watchful eye. By collecting individual personal information in this way, an individual's privacy and autonomy is violated. The individual's privacy is violated in that the information collected is the individual's personal property; it pertains to their actions and personal details. By collecting and collating this information, the individual's right to control and keep it private is violated. Furthermore, the individual's autonomy is jeopardized as a result of the 48 This inside/outside distinction is still valid despite the advent of wireless technology and cyberspace communications such as emails since even though there might not be the physical wire to 'cut-into', there is still a data-stream, a signal or some notion of the communication having an inside to which only certain individuals are allowed access and an outside where the rest of the world exists. Furthermore, there is still an established understanding that even though it could nominally be thought that communications are 'in the air' they are still 'private' communications between set individuals. 51 The term dataveillance refers to when the individual is monitored through the digital footprint s/he leaves as s/he carries out activities in both the digital and real worlds, or datamining whereby the individual's personal details are collected and categorized. The argument for dataveillance is based on the premise that 'the planning of terrorist activity creates a pattern or ''signature'' that can be found in the ocean of transaction data created in the course of everyday life'. By collecting this data the aim is to create a profile so as to predict a person's future actions or locate specific individuals. effect these collection activities can have on how s/he formulates their own will. For example, in George Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-Four it was not just the lack of privacy that was so harrowing, but rather the use of surveillance as a major mechanism for social control. Knowing one is being watched by an asymmetrical gaze forces the target to act as he thinks is expected of him, since he is unable to know if he is actually being scrutinized at any particular point in time. For Foucault, 'he who is subject to a field of visibility, and who knows it, assumes responsibility for the constraints of power; he makes them play upon himself; he plays both roles; be becomes the principle of his own subjection'.
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Intelligence collection can also violate an individual's autonomy when it uses deception or manipulation. Using 'unofficial covers', for example, whereby an intelligence officer receives a new identity to allow access to areas and people otherwise out of reach, involves extensive levels of deception and manipulation. However, by intentionally providing another individual with false information, the intelligence officer is distorting the individual's view of reality and therefore forcing the individual into decisions based on the officer's terms rather than his own reasons and wishes. How the individual thinks he should act is no longer based on his own choices but on manipulation by the intelligence officer. Decisions on, for example, whether to trust the officer, how to act around him and what secrets one should divulge are all altered by the deceptions used.
Finally, the harm ethic argued here can prove interesting in relation to the attempts during the 2001-9 Bush administration to redefine the parameters of torture. The Bybee Memos were a set of legal memoranda that redefined torture as only those activities that were to cause serious physical injury, such as 'organ failure, impairment of bodily function, or even death' or mental harm that would prove to last 'months or even years'. 53 However, such redefinitions, it can be argued with reference to the harm ethic, established excessively indulgent parameters of torture, while also ignoring important harms to the individual's sense of self-worth. Examples of interrogation tactics used at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay include, 'breaking chemical lights and pouring the phosphoric liquid on detainees; pouring cold water on naked detainees; beating with rope; sodomising a detainee with a chemical light and a broom stick; and using military working dogs to frighten and intimidate'; 54 'hooding, hand cuffing with flexi-cuffs, beatings, slapping, punching, kicking; being paraded round naked outside 
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Intelligence and National Security the cells; exposure to loud noise; and prolonged exposure to intense sun over several hours; 55 and even forcing a prisoner to masturbate in front of jeering captors. 56 According to the parameters prescribed in the Bybee Memo, these activities would not count as torture given that the damage is neither severe nor sufficiently long-lasting. In comparison, the harm ethic promoted in this article maintains that these are some of the most serious violations of an individual's physical integrity, mental integrity and sense of self-worth. The physical and psychological pain experienced is extreme in the immediate instance, regardless of any long-term effects. 57 Moreover, as William Twining and Barrie Paskins note, it is not just the intensity and quality of physical pain that is important, but also the special disutility that is associated with the 'higher pains' only available to creatures that can experience humiliation, shame, dread, anguish, and self-disgust. 58 There is, however, clearly a difference between the degrees of harm caused by wiretapping, deception, manipulation, and torture. The difference depends on first, which of the individual's vital interests is violated; second, the severity of the violation; and third, the duration of the violation. The first point argues that, all other things being equal, some interests such as physical and mental integrity can take precedence over the other interests such as autonomy, liberty, self-worth or privacy. 59 'Severity' refers to the degree of violation. This is because an individual's vital interests are not binary concepts -whole one minute and destroyed the next -but can experience a partial loss. For instance, there are various types of privacy spheres, and depending on how personal or intimate the sphere that is violated is the degree to which the individual's privacy is damaged is altered. By altering the severity of the violation one alters the level of harm caused. Finally, the degree of harm produced can depend on the temporal quality of the activity. This is because if acts of low severity become 'prolonged, recur continuously or occur at strategically untimely moments' they become chronic distractions and can begin to impede even those interests that are said to be timeless. 60 However, the point of 'other things being equal' demonstrates that the degree of harm caused is dependent on all three aspects brought together. For example, a prick on the finger just because it is 59 Berlin declared that in much the same way that boots were more important than the words of Shakespeare, liberty and autonomy are not necessarily the total first need of an individual. Berlin, 'Two Concepts of Liberty', p.124. 60 Feinberg, Harm to Others, pp.45-6. a physical violation is not a greater harm than being locked away for 20 years.
Therefore, the difference between tapping someone's wires and monitoring someone in a public space is the difference between the severities of the violation of privacy; the former is considered a more severe violation because it violates a more stringently maintained and socially established sphere of privacy as well as the understanding that individuals implicitly consent to a partial and temporary reduction of their privacies by freely electing to enter public spaces. The difference between manipulating and deceiving someone or blackmailing them is that the latter involves a more severe violation of the individual's autonomy. Finally, torture represents the most harmful of the activities, given that it violates all of an individual's vital interests and represents the most severe examples of how one might violate each of these interests.
Just War and Just Intelligence
While it has been argued thus far that intelligence collection can indeed cause harm to those it targets as a result of violating an individual's vital interests, and that this harm should be prevented, this does not mean that collection activities are always prohibited. Intelligence plays a vital role in protecting the political community. Given the correct circumstances and depending on the degree of harm caused, intelligence collection activities can be justified.
To this end, by using the just war tradition as a base it is possible to establish a set of just intelligence principles that can limit the harm intelligence collection causes while outlining what circumstances would be required to justify the harm caused.
Just War Meets Just Intelligence
It is impossible to think of a single 'just war doctrine', with a single point of linear development from a single idea. Instead, 'just war' is better understood as a set of 'recurrent issues and themes in the discussion of warfare . . . reflecting a general philosophical orientation towards the subject'. 61 The just war tradition is an organic, evolutionary set of concepts that have been developed over time in response to the moral issues of the day. Over the centuries the just war tradition has been developed and adapted by theologians, philosophers, military professionals and jurists in order to grapple with the notion that there are some acts, such as killing, that are considered to be gravely wrong, while understanding that in certain circumstances these same acts might be permissible.
What evolved was a set of principles designed to govern and limit the activity of war and the harm it can cause. These principles at the same time maintained the broader context of the duty of the public authorities to retain 61 Ian Clark, Waging War: A Philosophical Introduction (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1988) p.31.
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Intelligence and National Security the capacity to use violence for the protection of one's state or that of international peace and stability. 62 It is because the just war tradition attempts to reconcile this tension that it can be argued that it is the most appropriate starting-point in designing an ethical intelligence frameworkthat is, one able to understand if and when the harm caused by intelligence collection is justified in relation to the good of the political community. These just intelligence principles demand both a limitation on the harm done by intelligence collection, while also outlining exactly when harm is justified.
These just intelligence principles are as follows:
. Just cause: there must be a sufficient threat to justify the harm that might be caused by the intelligence collection activity. . Authority: there must be legitimate authority, representing the political community's interests, sanctioning the activity. . Intention: the means should be used for the intended purpose and not for other (political, economic, social) objectives. . Proportion: the harm that is perceived to be caused should be outweighed by the perceived gains. . Last resort: less harmful acts should be attempted before more harmful ones are chosen. . Discrimination: There should be discrimination between legitimate and illegitimate targets
Just Cause
The principle of 'just cause' is often considered by many theorists to be a core just war principle as it interrogates the justification for going to war. 63 Thomas Aquinas argued that for a war to be just there must be some reason or injury to give cause, namely that 'those who are attacked must be attacked because they deserve it on account of some fault'. 64 Currently, international law frames 'self-defence' as the main justification for going to war. 65 The just cause equivalent for intelligence collection is, therefore, that there must be a sufficient threat to justify the harm that might be caused. It is the role of intelligence agencies to safeguard and maintain a state's 'national security and, in particular, its protection against threats '. 66 It is the detection and prevention of these threats that enables intelligence agencies to protect the state and its people. As such, the just cause for the use of intelligence collection is one of self-defence against threats. Depending on the type and degree of the threat, the type and degree of harm allowed is then altered. That is, the more harmful the act is the greater the threat required to justify it. Also, the burden of proof required to indicate whether the threat is real can vary according to the harm caused. Specifically, the greater the harm that might be caused the greater the evidence required to prove the threat real. Activities that cause only a low level of harm would only require a 'reasonable suspicion' of a threat to act as a just cause, whereas those activities that cause greater degrees of harm would require more concrete evidence to demonstrate to an objective observer that a clear threat exists. In this way, the initial data collection can be achieved under a reasonable suspicion using the least harmful collection activities so as to understand the threat better, and if necessary the information gained can provide evidence for the just cause that legitimizes further intelligence collection. For example, the high level of tension between the West and the Soviet bloc during the Cold War represented a legitimate just cause for using several forms of intelligence collection. Between the United Kingdom and the United States, on the other hand, it could not be argued that there was any immediate threat as to justify anything but the least harmful means of intelligence collection. Outlining different levels of evidence in this way also prevents a paradox occurring where in order to have a just cause there is a need to collect information first to act as a just cause. But, by using those intelligence collection activities that cause a low level of harm there is only a need for a low level of threat to act as a just cause. The information collected from this initial, low harm investigation can then act as the just cause for higher levels of harm.
Just Intelligence and Authority
For a war to be considered morally permissible according to the just war tradition it must be authorized by the right authority, that is, those who have the right to command by virtue of their position. As Aquinas stated, 'the ruler for whom the war is to be fought must have the authority to do so' and 'a private person does not have the right to make war'. 67 Those entrusted with the common good are charged with the duty to protect the political community: 'since the care of the common weal is committed to those who are in the right authority, it is their business to watch over the common weal'.
68 Therefore, it is only that body which is charged with protecting the common good and holds their interests in mind that can take them to war justly.
Similarly, one can argue that in order for intelligence collection to be just, there must be a legitimate authority present to sanction the harms that can be caused. Since some forms of intelligence collection will involve a degree of harm, society needs to vest the authority to act in certain institutions or 67 Aquinas, 'From Summa Theologiae', p.214. 68 Ibid.
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Intelligence and National Security those that represent the political community and their wishes. Furthermore, one might argue that intelligence collection needs to be authorized by a body that is able to ensure that the just intelligence principles are being met fully and without bias. Those planning, performing or even managing operations might have invested interests in getting their job done. For example, there is a huge external pressure on intelligence services to provide the 'correct' information in a timely fashion to their clients. As such, as Sir David Omand has remarked, there is need for 'proper oversight from outside the intelligence community and a robust mechanism where any individual issue raised can be done so without fear, yet done in ways that will protect the essential secrecy of the business'. 69 The most notable example of this notion of right authority as used in intelligence collection is for a wiretap-warrant application. In the Anglo-American intelligence system there is an oversight mechanism which utilizes either the judiciary branch (American system) or the political branch (UK system) to act as just authorities and to ensure that certain principles have been satisfied. 70 This represents a valuable model for the notion of legitimate authority, as evidence is presented through a specific mechanism that is versed in weighing proof of evidence while holding the interests of the wider political community and ensuring certain criteria are met. By extrapolating this system to other means of intelligence collection activities it could be possible to offer a means of authorizing intelligence swiftly while ensuring it is authorized by an appropriate oversight body.
Just Intelligence and Right Intentions
Just war theorists think it insufficient merely to have an objective just cause for war; there must also be a proper subjective right intention. The intention behind an act alters the moral quality of the act. Indeed, intention has become an important part of our common moral discourse, altering how we talk about, speculate on, and judge actions. 71 Leaders must be able to justify their decisions, noting that they had the right intentions; 'for those that slip the dogs of war, it is not sufficient that things turn out for the best'. 72 The reasoning behind this is that it is very possible for 'war to be declared by legitimate authority and just cause, yet nonetheless be made unlawful through a wicked intention '. 73 This means that the reasons given are not simply there to serve as a cover for the pursuit of other aims, even if there is a just cause. The intention of the war must reflect the just cause which is used to justify the war. If it is a war of self-defence, for example, then the intention of the war must be to deal with this and not fight a war of aggrandizement. The intention behind the war is then demonstrated through the conduct of the war itself, in that wars with the intention of self-defence should not involve tactics of domination or subjugation.
By drawing on this logic it can be argued that in order for intelligence collection to be morally permissible the intelligence collection means should be used for the stated purpose and not for other political, economic, or social objectives. This right intention should flow from the just cause used to justify the intelligence collection. This means that the just cause is not therefore used as a pretext for a host of unrelated actions. What is more, the actions used should reflect the right intention.
For example, since the just cause for the just intelligence principle is to assess and determine the reality of a threat, the intention, and therefore the means employed, should directly correlate to this threat. The intention should be to investigate this threat. The means who is targeted, and how much harm is allowed, should all flow from the intended purpose of dealing with the threat. This just intelligence criterion is designed to prevent the use of intelligence collection for personal, political or economic gain, even though there might be an existing sufficient threat.
This principle can have important implications for information collection. In instances where a warrant is applied for -for wiretaps or property searches for example -the terms of the warrant should reflect the just cause, and in turn the type of search carried out should reflect the intent behind the warrant. 74 This means that the investigating officer may only search 'places which might reasonably be suspected of containing the specified offending articles'. 75 If the officer was to search places outside what is reflected in the just cause, then he is acting with an ulterior motive to the just cause and is therefore not working with the right intention. 76 However, anything which is thrown-up incidentally to the lawful search may be seized as complies with the warrant, since even though the items found were not on the warrant, the type of search carried out that found the offending articles is still in-line with 73 Aquinas, 'From Summa Theologiae', p.214. 74 'A search under a warrant may only be a search to the extent required for the purpose for which the warrant was issued' Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 x 16(8). 75 R. Stone, The Law of Entry, Search and Seizure (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2005) p.171. 76 Obviously, there might be some difficulty proving that the officer was using the power of the warrant for an ulterior motive sometimes, but given that the intent is reflected in the actions carried out, the way in which the search is conducted leave little room for doubt that the intent was improper. For example, if a warrant is obtained to search premises for evidence of tax fraud, it would be unreasonable to believe that they would find evidence of the fraud in places where they might find drugs. See D. Feldman, The Law Relating to Entry, Search and Seizure (London: Butterworths 1986) p.171.
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Intelligence and National Security the original intention. Just because the outcome does not match with the original intention does not alter the fact that the officer was working with the correct intention in the first place. Another implication of this principle is reflected in the current debate on personal information databases and how crossover information collection should be restricted. If information is collected -DNA, fingerprints, personal data for example -under a just cause with the appropriate degree of evidence, but was incidentally connected to another crime, then the information can be used since the original just cause and correct intention was present. This would be analogous to finding illegal goods incidentally while performing a legal search. However, what is not permissible is to use a just cause such as tax fraud to justify the collection and retention of DNA, as this type of information is unrelated and is not reflecting the original just cause, clearly outside what should be the correct intention.
77

Just Intelligence and Last Resort
In the just war tradition the principle of last resort is an attempt to allow those relatively benign means of responding to a crisis, such as diplomacy or economic pressure, a chance to resolve the issue before resort to organized violence is permitted. This way, if it is possible, more harmful acts are avoided. Richard Miller argues that, 'even if [force] is sometimes necessary and morally justifiable, but the just cause could be achieved by non-violence means then the party has a moral duty to prefer these methods'. 78 However, Robert Phillips warns that, 'it is a mistake to suppose that ''last'' necessarily designates the final move in a chronological series of actions'. 79 If it did, then force would never be legitimized since one could always continue to negotiate. Instead, what it demands is that actors 'carefully evaluate all the different strategies that might bring about the desired end, selecting force as it appears to be the only feasible strategy for securing those ends'. 80 If time and circumstances permitted other means short of force then they should be used; there is not a rigid sequence which one must follow at all times, but an understanding that the most harmful acts should not be used if less harmful activities can achieve the same result. 77 Moreover, if the individual from which the information was collected was proved to be innocent in regards to the investigation then the original just cause was proved false and any later investigations which might use it would require new a new just cause and evidence. Any later investigations could not retain the information incidentally and use it as they could not prove that they retrospective intent Based on this conception of last resort, one can argue for a similar rationale for the just intelligence principles. In order for an intelligence collection means to be just, it must only be used once other less or none harmful means have been exhausted or are redundant. Any attempt to deal with the threat should use the least harmful first and thus give the opportunity for more harmful activities to be avoided. While there is no rigid methodology or steps that must be worked through, it does require that some of the more harmful actions are not resorted to out of ease, expediency or preference.
Just Intelligence and Proportionality
The idea of proportionality is one of the oldest principles not only of the just war tradition, but also of moral theory and military strategy in general. 81 Leaders and individuals are constantly tasked with weighing up the costs of an action against what can be gained. The principle of proportionality is similar in that it establishes the notion that the violence of war should be proportionate to the threat that it is meant to overcome, placing a limit on the amount of damage permissible for a given action. Kateri Carmola argues that the need for a principle of proportionality is rooted in the human tendency towards disproportionate, unmeasured, passionate and cruel responses. 82 Clausewitz warns that war by its very nature tends towards the extreme and the utmost use of force: 'an act of violence which in its application knows no bounds and in which a proportionate response to another's power is met by an escalating response and so on'. 83 Whilst war may be the legitimate answer to right a wrong in certain circumstances, not all wrongs that a state can experience are of sufficient magnitude to justify the harm that might be caused: 'some wrongs are neither grievous nor widespread enough to legitimate the inevitable evils that war entails'. 84 One can argue that, for the intelligence collection to be just, the level of harm that one perceives to be caused, or prevented, by the collection should be outweighed by the perceived gains. In collecting intelligence there is always a perceived end -what is expected to be gained and the harm that could be caused. The principle of proportionality is designed to evaluate these two factors and determine if, on balance, an overall greater level of resultant harm would outweigh what is gained from the intelligence collection. Furthermore, the principle of proportionality will only take the 'good' which contributes to the just cause as a positive, while it will include all 'bad' results as a negative. For example, it does not take into account a boosted economy as a 'good' for a war of self-defence while the damage it might do to the economy can be taken into account as a negative. For intelligence collection, this means that only information which will contribute to the just cause can be accounted as a positive; other harms, such as harm to the target, harm to the agent, as well as the harm to society in general, can be taken as a negative.
Just Intelligence and Discrimination
The requirement that an attack must discriminate between combatants and non-combatants is one of the most stridently codified just war rules and is reflected in the international laws of war. 85 This moral distinction -most often seen in the differentiation between armed soldiers who constitute legitimate targets and unarmed civilians as illegitimate targets -is based, first, on the moral right of self-defence. According to this right the armed soldier poses a threat and can be attacked out of pre-emptive self-defence; and second, as Walzer argues, that the soldier has acted in a way as to become a 'dangerous man' and has thereby waived or temporarily suspended his normal protective rights. 86 By taking up arms the soldier has clearly demarcated himself as separate from the ordinary civilian and is both bestowed with 'combatant's privilege', an exemption from being tried for murder of the other soldiers, as well as sacrificing some of his other rights in the process, that is, the right not to be attacked.
One can argue that for just intelligence collection there must be discrimination between targets. Just as soldiers waive their protective rights by acting in a threatening way, so too can any individual act in such a way as to make himself threatening and forfeit his protective rights. For example, Tony Pfaff and Jeffery Tiel argue that, 'consent to participate in the world of national security on all levels of a country's self-defence structure together with the quality of the information possessed' justifies them as targets. 87 This principle of discrimination argues that there are certain acts people can perform that mark them as legitimate targets, and that without these acts they are otherwise illegitimate targets. In this way, civilians and not just soldiers can become legitimate targets by particular actions that mark them as a threat. Walzer notes that while it may be hard to understand this extension of combatant status beyond the category of soldiers, through modern warfare this has become common enough. Civilians can become 'partially assimilated' when they are 'engaged in activities threatening and harmful to their enemies'. 88 The principle of discrimination for the just intelligence principles therefore distinguishes between those individuals without involvement in a threat (and thereby protected), and those who have made themselves a part of the threat (and by so doing have become legitimate targets). According to the degree to which an individual has assimilated himself, either through making himself a threat or acting in a manner that forfeits his rights, the level of harm which can be used against him will alter. For example, terrorists and intelligence officers are both legitimate targets because they have 'fully entered the game' through their actions. In comparison, a piano tuner, who has done nothing that might be seen as threatening or acted in any way to waive his protective rights, is an illegitimate target. Furthermore, a scientist who works on weapons has taken a job which places him within the security infrastructure of a state and has taken on vital information and thus forfeited certain protective rights and consequently becomes a legitimate target for some of the intelligence collection harms. He has only partially entered the game and therefore is only a partially assimilated target.
Conclusion
This article has posed the problem of how intelligence collection can be conducted ethically. In brief, secret intelligence collection is a vital and even indispensible tool in the eternal vigilance required to protect the state from a variety of internal and external threats. However, its effective use initiates acts that can cause severe harm to those it targets and, as such, without further justification would not be allowed. As Quinlan argues, 'in the face of that tension, we cannot say that morality must simply be set aside; we have to identify some conceptual structure for legitimising and disciplining the activity'. 89 In response to that challenge, this article has proposed an ethical construct constituted of two important parts: the first delineates the harm that intelligence collection can cause, making it clear what it is that assigns an immoral quality to intelligence collection; the second outlines a framework that both limits the use of intelligence collection and acknowledges those situations when the harm caused is justifiable.
First, it is essential to recognize that intelligence collection involves a myriad of activities, making an all-encompassing declaration on the moral status of all activities not only impossible but unhelpful. Instead, there is a need for an ethical framework that is nuanced, one able to calibrate and evaluate these different activities and compare them with each other. The harm framework proposed here provides the means for understanding how 88 Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, pp.145-6. 89 Quinlan, 'Just Intelligence', p.12.
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Intelligence and National Security very different activities can be understood in comparison with each otherand in doing so offers a means to establish a core understanding about how intelligence collection affects people and why it is considered unacceptable in relation to ethical standards. It is then possible to incorporate these different activities within the just intelligence framework, a framework that can evaluate the harm caused and resolve this with the duties of the political community. The just intelligence principles each provide a limit on the use of intelligence collection. At the same time they outline a set of ethical measures which ensure that harm is only justified when there is a threat of sufficient proportion, recognized by those whose responsibility it is to protect the people, used against those who are justified targets and conducted with the intention of protection and selfdefence. Under these normative guidelines, then the harm caused becomes justifiable.
While it is possible to argue that some intelligence systems adhere to the ethical principles discussed, the application is both inconsistent and implicit. For example, while the principle of legitimate authority is arguably used for wiretaps and property searches, there is no such systemic oversight and authorization for other forms of intelligence collection. Furthermore, while intelligence agencies might only target threatening people as they are the only ones worth targeting, there is no explicit limit on who or what can be targeted. Therefore, only by explicitly applying the ethical principles as outlined here before the fact can intelligence guarantee that its application of methods be ethically justified. Only by using both of these different ethical frameworks is it possible to understand the dual quality of intelligence collection: that intelligence collection does indeed cause harm, but that sometimes this harm is necessary in order to protect those for whom a state carries responsibility.
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